

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 3, 1952

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Mr. Bundy has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Panel on May 16 to 18.

Mr. Bundy has made arrangements for the June meeting to be held in the meeting room of the Center for International Studies, which is on the fifth floor of the Sloane Building of MIT, at 50 Memorial Drive. Since the day of the 19th is not a good day for all members of the Panel to meet, Mr. Bundy would like to know if you could arrange to stay over in Cambridge so that the Panel could meet on the 21st as well as the 20th. He would also like to know whether you wish him to find a place to stay for you in Cambridge. Mr. Bundy's address is in care of Winthrop House J-24, Harvard University. Dr. Oppenheimer has asked me to add that there will be a meeting on the 19th of those who can arrange to be there that day, in addition to the 20th and 21st.

Sincerely yours,

Katherine Russell
Katherine Russell,
Secretary to the Director

Mr. Allen Dulles, Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Copy to Mr. McGeorge Bundy

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"When separated from enclosures, handle with care."

as *unclassified*
(Insert proper classification)

State Dept., NSC reviews completed

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Panel of Consultants on Arms and Policy

Minutes* of Meeting of
May 16 - 18, 1952
at
Princeton, N. J.

I. Members Present

All members of the Panel were present: Dr. Oppenheimer, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Bundy throughout, Dr. Bush and Mr. Dulles on May 16th and 17th, and Mr. Dickey on May 17th and 18th. Most of the formal agreements noted below were reached on May 18th.

II. Areas of Inquiry

It was agreed that the purpose of the Panel is to examine three connected subjects:

- A. The problem of present U. S. Policy in the Disarmament Commission of the United States;
- B. The problem of U. S. Policy on armament control in the next few months, with special reference to the autumn meeting of the General Assembly;
- C. The broad area of the relationship between armaments and policy in the next several years, with special reference to
 1. the prospective development of weapons of mass destruction;
 2. the relationship of the USSR and the U. S.;
 3. the problem of survival.

Plainly these topics are internally connected, and equally plainly the last is the one of controlling importance. For this reason the Panel agreed to give its major attention to problem "C", hoping that it might make enough progress to permit constructive comment, perhaps in the late summer, on plans for meeting problem "B".

On problem "A", the Panel agreed that for the present it could do little more than hold itself available for any consultation that Mr. Cohen may desire; individual members of the Panel have already had such discussion with Mr. Cohen, and close contact will be maintained, especially through Dr. Oppenheimer.

* These minutes have no formal standing and are submitted solely for the convenience of Panel members.

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III. Method of Procedure

The following general plan of action was agreed:

A. For many reasons, the first and indispensable requirement of the Panel is adequate briefing on the present position and likely future of the arms race. A real and not merely hypothetical picture of this contest must be in mind before the Panel can think effectively on problems of arms and policy. As soon as possible after necessary clearances have been obtained, the Panel will share its information on this problem. It is hoped that this may be possible at the next meeting (June 19-20 in Cambridge, Mass.; see VI below).

B. While clearance is being obtained, certain information can be developed, or enquiries begun, which may be helpful to the Panel. The following were settled on; and responsibilities were assigned as noted:

1. Mr. Dickey was to ask the Department of State to help in providing answers to a series of questions about American public opinion. The areas of special interest to the Panel included:

- a. attitudes toward terminology: Is "disarmament" a bad word? Is "control" better?
- b. expectations of war or peace between the U. S. and the USSR now and in the middle future;
- c. knowledge and opinion of disarmament discussion in the United Nations;
- d. opinion on the present and future state of the arms race.

The problem of framing appropriate questions was left to Mr. Dickey and the Department.

2. Mr. Bundy was to find out the present state of knowledge and inquiry in and out of Washington, on relevant aspects of Soviet thought and action. He was also authorized to request the State Department's assistance in historical analysis of Soviet behavior in negotiations on arms policy, and also in the study of public and official attitudes in countries between the U. S. and the USSR. He will inquire into the work of Mr. Grenville Clark; and finally, he will check on the housekeeping of this itinerant Panel.

3. Dr. Oppenheimer was asked to locate Admiral Stevens, in the hope that he would offer constructive speculation on the way in which the Soviet Government might react to various possible developments in arms policy. Dr. Oppenheimer also undertook to prepare some thoughts on the character of public response in this country to the development of super armament.

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4. Mr. Johnson will report the basic plan of the Panel to Assistant Secretary Hickerson. He will also invite Mr. Bohlen to attend the June meeting, or part of it.

IV. Character of the Study

If the problem were simple, the object of the Panel would be to solve the problem. But it seemed clear that the problem of arms and policy had no simple solution, and indeed no solution of any kind which would be applicable to all situations. The Panel, therefore, felt bound to examine many different possible situations, and many variant conditions under which such situations might have variant results. Six years earlier, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report had proceeded on two premises: first, that reasonably complete security was attainable; and second, that there might be some trust in and from the Kremlin. In 1952 both of these assumptions seemed doubtful; the Panel was required to think in terms of a world in which safety would be limited, and mutual hostility a steady element in East-West relations.

The Panel's assignment and composition made it appropriate that the center of its enquiry should turn on the problems posed by the bomb-delivery-defense syndrome. In this syndrome one could discuss such possible developments as:

- A. A scorpion stalemate--which might or might not involve active war without the use of stings.
- B. An agreement, tacit or explicit, to abandon or avoid this or that specific instrument.
- C. A limiting of areas of action which might "reduce the reach" of armaments.
- D. A decision to maintain, explicitly or tacitly, distinctly separate levels of force, so that one form of hostility might not inevitably lead to another.
- E. A collective supervision with incomplete but significant authority.
- F. A need for preventive war.
- G. A Soviet need for preventive war.

These are merely samples of the sort of possibility with which the Panel might concern itself. Each is subject to modification in a number of ways. The problem is not likely to resolve itself into one of selecting a specific and fixed course of action which can be confidently recommended. It is more likely that after some situations are dismissed as unacceptable, and therefore to be avoided, so far as policy can do so, (eg., G above), others will be left as alternatives of varying likelihood and desirability, and the problem of policy will appear as one of guiding the actions and statements of the United States in such a way as to increase the chance of more agreeable results, without foreclosing alternative choices if they should become necessary.

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Though the developing arms race seems to be the natural first point of focus for the Panel, it is not the only way into the problem. It was suggested that an examination of certain significant areas of political tension might also turn up important connections between policy and the control of armaments. One area which was mentioned in this connection was that of Germany. Granting the difficulties of this type of analysis, the Panel agreed not to give it up without a try.

The Panel is acutely aware of the degree to which all propositions about the subject of arms and policy are conditional and interconnected. This awareness leads on to a suspicion that even at the end of its study, the Panel may be unable to present a coordinated pattern of desirable policy--though it is too soon to abandon this possibility. Yet this does not discourage us--for we seem agreed that short of such large conclusions, we may be able to reach useful ends. Five which were particularly emphasized in the discussions were the following:

- A. We may learn more about ways in which action and discussion could be used to illuminate (and even perhaps to modify) basic Soviet thinking on these topics.
- B. We may be able to indicate, if only by reporting our own experience, the degree to which the way one thinks about these problems is modified by trying to consider them as a whole.
- C. We may be able to suggest ways in which information and action may be geared toward a recapture of flexibility in approaching these problems.
- D. We may be able to determine in some small measure the ways in which power and policy may combined in forms which tend more to deter than to detonate.
- E. A closer examination of technical problems may indicate specific areas in which evident and uncomplicated dangers or opportunities exist and should be dealt with.

After this diffuse and indefinite discussion, it may be appropriate to note that the Panel promised itself to try to remember that in international policy--and especially in the control of arms races--the things which work are ordinarily simple.

V. Dr. Bush's initiative.

Dr. Bush had intended to discuss with the Panel a problem that seemed to him of some urgency. Since the necessary clearance had not been obtained, he refrained from consulting the Panel in any formal fashion, limiting himself to hearing the Panel's reaction to newspaper reports of forthcoming thermo-nuclear tests. Dr. Bush will act in this matter as an individual, at least until such time as the Panel may be fully cleared.

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VI. Future Meetings

A comparison of schedules indicated that the Panel might be able to meet, except for Dr. Bush, in Cambridge on the afternoon of June 19th and on June 20th. Mr. Bundy will make arrangements for this meeting, and inform members of the Panel. Dates for further meetings that seem possible at this time, and which Panel members may wish to protect, are July 21 - 23, August 18 - 20, and September 10 - 12. New England is pleasant in these periods.

Respectfully submitted

by McGeorge Bundy,
Executive Secretary

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NOTE:

The attached list of points is, of course, completely flexible. The Panel may prefer, for example, to consider point No. 3 at the outset of today's meeting, and, whatever the order, may desire to discuss this point as well as the following ones without others present except the secretary. Before arranging for members of the State Department staff to join the meeting, I would appreciate knowing your desires in this matter.



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Points to be discussed at second session of
panel of consultants, Tuesday May 6, 1952.

1. Report on current status of U. S. proposals for the Disarmament Commission.
2. General political considerations bearing upon disarmament work.
Relationship to other major problems -- to the "leveling off" of Western defense preparations -- to likely alternative Soviet reactions to growth of Western strength.
Possible period and forum in which serious disarmament negotiations with the USSR would be likely to be productive from the political point of view and favorable from the point of view of technical developments.
3. Methods of operation and approach in the development of comprehensive plans.
4. Major elements of national military strength.
Possibility of selection of limited number of crucial elements, control of which would be minimum components of workable, comprehensive disarmament plan.
5. Possible methods of control of such elements.

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ATOMIC SCIENTISTS OF CHICAGO, INC.

956 EAST FIFTY-EIGHTH STREET

CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS

May 17, 1952

MIDWAY 3-0800
EXTENSION 1414

Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

We were pleased to learn, through an interview with Messrs. Hickerson and Arneson in the State Department, of the recent creation of a Panel of Consultants on Disarmaments; and of your participation in the work of this important body. You are doubtless aware of the enormous magnitude of the task and the vital opportunity for constructive service which this panel can render.

We understand that the directive of the Panel emphasizes the need for formulation of the control mechanisms for conventional armaments, it being considered in the State Department that control mechanisms for atomic armaments are already relatively well formulated in the "Baruch Plan". It was made clear, however, that further study of the atomic problems is not excluded and that the panel is free to steer its own course in this respect.

The need for a study of conventional armaments is of course great, but we wish to take the liberty of pointing out the very special reasons why a thorough restudy of all possible atomic armament limitations or control schemes must not be neglected at this time. The urgency arises from the fact that the stockpiles of atomic explosives are rapidly growing so large that the inevitable uncertainties in any control scheme could leave undetected a decisive number of hidden bombs. Even after complete access to production facilities has been obtained, there will remain what amounts to an irreducible percentage uncertainty in the verification of past production. We estimate that this uncertainty will almost surely be greater than 10%, perhaps several times greater. When the actual stockpiles become so big that the possible hidden stockpile is large enough to be decisive in a hypothetical future war, it will become technically impossible

-2-

to devise an acceptable control scheme. When that time comes - and it may be very near - there will be no foreseeable end to the atomic armament race except the disastrous one. It is thus imperative that no stone be left unturned in trying to find a basis for agreement on atomic (and other) armament limitations before it is too late. It appears that there will never be another time as propitious as the present. We are aware that the difficulties are great, but are nevertheless alarmed to find in our contacts with the State Department a lack of adequate appreciation of the technical reasons for the urgency of the problem.

The "Baruch Plan" mechanism for control of atomic production plants is too strict to be realistic in the light of the inevitable uncertainties in past production, and the relatively minor role of future production for many years after entering into the control plan. Furthermore relatively little popular demand for power from nuclear fuels has appeared in the past five years. Any control plan will involve some sacrifice of short-term security at least on the atomic side, which must be carefully assessed and weighed against the gain in the prospects of long-term survival. Some mechanism less comprehensive than that of the majority plan may now be more realistic and require relinquishing less sovereignty. It seems to be felt in high quarters that reducing the strictness of a plan will not influence its acceptability to the Soviet leaders, but this cannot be proved without actually writing less demanding plans and trying to sell them, with emphasis on the mutual interest that the two sides have in not destroying each other.

The balance between the short-term and the long-term requirements is so delicate that the search for an acceptable atomic limitations plan requires the devoted attention of just such an able and high-level group as your Panel, if there is to be any hope of finding a solution. Your possible preoccupation with the mechanisms of conventional disarmament must not be accepted as a reason for not pursuing the atomic side with vigor, for the very reason that the two cannot be separated and you are thus the only group that can handle the atomic task, or at least supervise it. We feel that you are in a favorable position of prestige to attract to yourselves the talent and material aid needed for the appropriate expansion of your efforts and organization. This is the course which we respectfully and humbly, but hopefully, urge upon you.

Very sincerely yours,



R. L. Meier, Chairman